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Abstract The concept of green payments together with single and multiple bidding pro-
cesses for short-term spectrum auctions are compared based on two reference cases: (1)
when the users and the auctioneer are aware of the value of the reserve price, and (2) when
the value of the reserve price is known only to the auctioneer. This involves a novel
concept known as the green payment. This concept is combined with the use of proba-
bilities to determine the users participating in the auction process. The purpose of the green
payment and the probability is to help in reducing the amount of energy wasted as a result
of the auction process. The utility of each user and that of the wireless service provider
with and without the green payment is also examined. The revenue obtained from each of
the examined models is also compared to determine which model is more profitable for the
WSP. This paper shows that the use of multiple bidding process for short-term spectrum
auctions gives a better performance measure when compared to the single bidding process,
more particularly when the value of the reserve price is known to the auctioneer and the
users in the system. It also shows that using the proposed probability equation in combi-
nation with the concept of the green payment helps in reducing the amount of energy
consumed by the system.
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1 Introduction
Demand for the radio spectrum is presently growing faster than its capacity [1, 2]. It is also
envisioned that the future heterogeneous wireless devices shall require different bit rates
and transmit power while satisfying the demands of the users [2]. Furthermore, as a result
of the rapid growth in the applications requiring the use of the radio spectrum, scarcity of
the most useful frequency bands for mobile communications is posing a problem [3]. This
has led to the concepts of Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) as proposed in [4, 5], situ-
ations where DSA is delivered using a database as proposed in [6], the concept of the
Cognitive Radio (CR) network as proposed in [7, 8], and short-term spectrum auction as
proposed in [9]. Furthermore, due to a decline in the revenue of the wireless service
providers (WSPs) in comparison with the growing number of devices seeking access to the
radio spectrum, the concept of short-term spectrum auctions with a reserve price was
proposed in [10]. In addition, spectrum auctions were introduced as a possible regulatory
measure for user admittance in a wireless network, as a means of overcoming the perceived
scarcity of the radio spectrum. In such a situation, an auction process allows users who can
afford to pay the most to have access to the radio spectrum [11, 12]. An auction process is
important because the price paid for the spectrum has over the years been based on
potential price rather than allowing competition to reflect the actual price for the radio
spectrum. This has resulted in a growth in demand for the radio spectrum without a
corresponding growth in revenue [11]. The auction-based process provides an economic
vehicle for achieving opportunistic spectrum access in order to mitigate the scarcity and the
decline in revenue from the use of the radio spectrum. However, the primary users of the
radio spectrum are still not willing to share the radio spectrum based on the concept of
DSA [13]. This is because of concerns about interference from secondary users. Therefore,
in order to encourage the efficient use of the radio spectrum by the secondary access, the
authors of this paper had previously proposed the use of the green payments (GP) as an
incentive for efficient use of the radio spectrum in [14]. Furthermore, an auction based
balancing on revenue and fairness was proposed in [15]. In addition to the GP, [14] also
proposed an auction process with a Reserve Price (RP) while allocating the spectrum
dynamically with the help of a database which provides information about unused spec-
trum so that such bands can be allocated to the secondary users. This use of a RP can help
in increasing the revenue obtained from the use of the radio spectrum, especially when
demand is low as shown in [14]. However, the use of a RP, as proposed in the model in
[14] highlights a number of problems. These include having a number of transmit channels
available based on the information provided by the database, but the channels are not put to
use after the auction and the allocation process. This is usually due to the fact that some of
the offered bids being below the RP. Lowering the RP might be an option. However, this
might lower the all-important revenue obtained for the use of the radio spectrum, or
increase the demand for the spectrum based on the economic principle of demand and
supply [11]. Therefore, the key focus of this paper is to examine how the short-term
spectrum auction with GP that was proposed in [14] can be redesigned to reduce the
amount of energy consumed during the bidding process while maximizing the use of the
radio spectrum. This paper also examines the satisfaction of the secondary users and that of
the WSP based on the proposed model. This paper is unique because it examines both the
economic and the performance characteristics of the wireless system during and after the
auction process.
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Yuefei et al. [16] proposed a 2 dimensional (2D) auction process for mobile wireless
users to enable exclusive access to the channels by users who desire to do so. The paper
showed that optimal social welfare could be achieved; however, the performance of the
system was not examined. Sheng et al. [17] proposed an auction-based spectrum allocation
scheme based on location privacy preserving dynamic spectrum auction that can enable
dynamic spectrum auction without leaking the position information of the user. The pro-
posed scheme was based on Privacy Preserving Bid Submission Protocol (PPBS) and
Private Spectrum Distribution Protocol (PSD) to help deal with the problem of privacy that
may occur during the auction process. A dynamic auction with auction period optimisation
was considered in [18]. A double-auction process for spectrum allocation for both the
buyer-side and seller-side that achieves truthfulness, individual rationality and budget-
balance was proposed in [19]. However, the proposed auction model did not take into
consideration the need to reduce the amount of energy consumed by wireless users par-
ticipating in the auction process, especially when some of the users are losing out as a
result of the auction process. The work in [20] examined the impact of cognitive radio on
the primary users quality of services by offering a means to compensate the primary users.
It utilized the mean and variance of the return on investment while proposing a distributed
market architecture that allows for a control channel in order to communicate price
information between the spectrum buyer and the seller.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the system
description by explaining each component of the model, while section III shows the system
model when all components are put together with a modeling scenario. Section IV presents
and discusses the result and finally section V provides the conclusions.
2 System Description
This paper investigates the use of single and multiple bidding processes in an auction-
based DSA network. This is done by using two groups of users: the Low Powered Users
(LPU) and the High Powered Users (HPU). Furthermore, a Spectrum Broker (SB), whose
responsibility is to carry out the auction process, and the database that provides information
to the spectrum broker regarding the available channels are also considered. The rela-
tionship between these three elements is described using Fig. 1.
In addition, two types of channels are assumed; one of the channels is dedicated to the
auction process and the other is used for transmission. The allocation of channels to the
users is carried out by the SB based on the bids submitted by the users and channel
availability. We assume accurate channel detection after channel allocation.
The auction process used is depicted in Fig. 2. The system consists of N number of users
and NTC transmission channels in each cell. During an auction period (t), NUSA users
indicates interest in seeking access by submitting a bid as illustrated using the clockwise
movement of A to B in Fig. 2. During each bidding period, the number of available
channels (NAC) is provided by the database. After the auction process, NWU winners
emerge. Based on the received requests and received Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR), the SB
applies the GP to the received bid, thereby subsidising the power efficient users and
making an inefficient user to pay a tax as proposed in [14]. After the application of the GP,
the users’ bid is checked against the RP as depicted by the clockwise movement B to C in
Fig. 2. Then the highest set of bidders with bids above the RP are offered the available
channels as depicted by the clockwise movement C to D. If more users than the number of
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available channels are offering a bid above the RP, then the number of users offered
channel is equal to the number of available channels. After the auction process, the win-
ning users are allocated a channel. However, not all winning users allocated a channel are
able to transmit successfully because of inference or noise from adjacent users sharing
same channel. NUT represents the number of users who are able to transmit after the
auction and the allocation process. However, a drawback of this approach is that two
channels are available, but only one channel is allocated. This is because only one of the
users is offering a price which is above the RP. Hence, this work aims at solving this
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Fig. 1 The elements in the system
Fig. 2 General modelling scenario
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problem in order to maximize the use of the radio spectrum. This paper, therefore, pro-
poses a model of multiple bidding process during a bidding period. A bidding period is a
time window for users to submit their bids. This is further described later in this paper.
Furthermore, in order to reduce the amount of energy wasted during the auction process,
before submitting a bid, the user calculates the probability of being among the highest
bidders based on the model described later in this paper. Based on this calculation, the user
decides to either participate in the auction process or wait till the next bidding period.
The auction process being proposed is envisioned to be carried out based on an auto-
mated system in the user device with little human interaction. This should be interfaced
with the user device such that the users can indicate their minimum price increment and
maximum price for the auction.
2.1 The Users Bid
The users in this paper have a similar valuation for the radio spectrum, an assumption that
is widely used in auction theory based models. The valuation of the users is drawn from a
range of values represented as [Vmax;Vmin]. This is formulated based on the conventional
settings in economics where users have a private valuation as done in [21]. Each user
independently draws their bid with a probability density function as giving in Eq. (1).
fVðviÞ ¼ 1
VmaxðiÞ  VminðiÞ ð1Þ
where Vmax and Vmin are the maximum and the minimum possible bid valuation of a user
respectively in price units. The valuation (vi) depends on the user’s budget per file. Hence,
this valuation is always less than the maximum budget of the users. This work does not
examine scenarios where the bidders run out of their budget; rather, the budget for all the
users in the system is the same and specified in the parameters Table 1.
Table 1 Parameters used
Parameters Value
Interference threshold -40 dBm
½bmin bmax [5 8]
Thrmax 4.5 bps/Hz
a 0.65
SNIRmax 21 dB
SNIRthreshold 1.8 dB
Cr 0.5
Height of base station 15 m
Budget 100,000 Price Units
Transmit power [LPU, HPU] [0.09, 1.09] W/bit
½Vmin Vmax [5 8]
Bid reduction 10%
Desired percentile 30
b 0.045
Number of cells (Noc) 100
Processing time 0.25 ms
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Each of the bidders generates a bid using the distribution shown in Eq. (2). bi is the bid
generated by user i and is always greater than zero ðbi[ 0Þ
biðPrice UnitÞ ¼ NUSA  NACð ÞVi
NAC
þ Vmin ð2Þ
for i ¼ 1; 2; . . .;NUSA and NUSA[NAC where Vi is derived from Eq. (1), NUSA is the
number of users seeking access to the radio spectrum during an auction period and NAC is
the number of available channels. Using Eq. (2), each of the users intending to transmit
generates a bid within a given time window known as the bidding period t. NUSA is always
greater than NAC for an auction to take place. Equation (2) assumes that all the users have
the knowledge of NAC and NUSA, an assumption that is quite strong but reasonable.
In some parts of this paper, it is assumed that the users can estimate the value of RP
based on information provided by the spectrum broker. Therefore, in such a scenario, it is
assumed that the user generates a bid above the RP as shown in Eq. (3) for user i:
bi ¼ ðNUSA  NACÞVi
NAC
þ rEST; for i ¼ 1; 2; 3; . . .;NUSA ð3Þ
where rEST is the estimated value of the RP.
2.2 The Reserve Price (RP)
The RP is the minimum price to be paid by any user intending to transmit before the
spectrum is allocated to such a user. The RP is introduced because the demand for the radio
spectrum is both time and space dependent. When the demand is low, the RP helps to retain
the minimum selling price of the WSP as shown in [14]. In this paper, the RP is formulated
by taking into account the current traffic load in the system, the frequency band in use, the
total number of channels in the system and the number of channels in use as shown in
Eq. (4):
RPðPrice UnitÞ ¼ CfNTCCr ð4Þ
where Cr is a constant in price unit which is used to specify the value of a spectrum band in
use. Cr is determined from the common knowledge regarding the price of the radio
spectrum and it is specified in Table 1. Users also believe that the bigger the size of the
network, the better the quality of service offered; hence, the total number of channels in the
system is also taken into consideration when calculating the RP. The congestion factor (Cf)
is introduced because of the laws of demand and supply as explained in [22]. The con-
gestion factor (Cf) is the number of requesting users per channel during an auction period
as shown below in Eq. (5):
Cf ¼ NUSA
NAC
ð5Þ
Cf is assumed to be the same for all the users who want to transmit within the same bidding
period (t).
2.3 The Energy Model
The energy model is represented using a 2 state Markov chain as shown in Fig. 3:
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1. A user who has file(s) to send moves into the OFF state and continues to be in this state
until such user is among the winning bidders.
2. A user, who is among the winning bidders, moves from the OFF state to the ON state.
3. The user remains in the ON state until after transmitting (if transmission is successful)
or until the user receives a failed signal either due to low offered bid compared to the
RP or due to a poor quality channel.
4. After transmitting, the user moves back to the OFF state before shutting down if no file
is to be sent again. However, if the user has another file to send, the user remains and
attempts again in the off state.
In the ON state, it is assumed that a transmission is successful provided the Signal to
Noise plus Interference Ratio (SNIR), and the RP are above the set thresholds, after which
the user moves back to the OFF state. If the user moves from the ON state to the OFF state,
and the thresholds are not met, then the energy consumed in processing the request of the
user during the state transition is considered as energy wasted. A processing time, which is
the time taken to process the received bid, is also assumed. All users that move from the
ON state to the OFF state have the same processing time.
2.4 The Green Payment (GP)
The green payment was earlier formulated in our work in [23]. The GP is either in the form
of a tax or a subsidy, and the main aim of introducing this is to allow the bids of the LPU to
be subsidised, to allow the bids of the HPU to be taxed and to increase the probability of
LPU winning the bid. This is because the assumed users in this work are opportunistic
spectrum users (secondary), who need to reduce their interference to others, especially the
primary users. This scheme should provide more confidence to the primary users and
provide them more confidence in sharing the network with secondary user. This is because
if low powered users are admitted into the system as secondary users, then, more often than
not, the interference to primary users should not be too significant. The scheme allows the
granting of access to the radio spectrum to the HPU only when the bid of the HPU after the
tax is above the RP and above the bids of the LPU with the subsidy. This is allowed
because sometimes due to the value of the money involved, low demand for the use of the
spectrum or the importance of the application seeking the use, the HPU should be allowed
to transmit after paying the price for using such transmit power. An equation for the GP
derived from the inverse of the Truncated Shannon Bound (TSB) is obtained to either tax
or subsidise the users [24]. The TSB represents the transmission rates that can be achieved
in practice given an adaptive modulation scheme in a real world scenario depending on the
SNIR of the user. The throughtput (Thr) of the system is giving as:
OFF ON 31
4
2
Fig. 3 Energy and system model as a two-state Markov chain
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Thr ¼
0 SNIR\SNIRthreshold
a:S SNIRð Þ SNIRthreshold\SNIR\SNIRmax
Thrmax SNIR[ SNIRmax
8
<
:
ð6Þ
SðSNIRÞ ¼ log2ð1þ SNIRÞ
where S SNIRð Þ is the Shannon bound and a is the rate reduction factor as defined in the
parameters Table, Thrmax is the maximum throughput for the codeset and Thr is the
throughput of the system. Thrmax and SNIRthreshold are specified in the parameters table. The
SNIRthreshold is the minimum threshold that allows the detection of the information at the
receiver and SNIRmax is the maximum SNIR beyond which there is no change in
throughput. TSB is used to derive the GP equation. The reason for using this equation is
due to the fact that the transmission rate is an important parameter. The transmission rate is
dependent on the SNIR which is dependent on transmit power and interference from other
users sharing same channel. The derived GP equation is shown in Eq. (7) as formulated
from the TSB:
GP Price Unitð Þ ¼ 2
1þh  1; If subsidy
21þh þ 1; If tax

ð7Þ
where  is the GP factor as derived later. The value of  is chosen in such a way that the GP
does not introduce too much tax/subsidy into the system that could lead to delay or
reduction in the system throughput, hence the reason for it being called the green payment
factor. h is the absolute value of the linear difference between the SNR value of a user i
ðwiÞ and the value of the SNR of a set threshold (wj)
hi ¼ wi  wj



 for i ¼ 1; 2; 3; . . .;NUSA ð8Þ
The set threshold (wj) is derived by first arranging the received SNR of the NUSA users
who are seeking access to the radio spectrum at time t in an ascending order
wt ¼ ½w1;w2;w3; . . .;wNUSA  ð9Þ
Then to determine which of the SNR at time t is the set threshold, Eq. (10) is used,
where Pc is the desired percentile.
jjj ¼ bPcNUSA
100
ð10Þ
Equation (10) gives an absolute value known as the percentile rank. This shows that
whatever the value of j, the jth SNR in Eq. (9) is the set threshold (wj). For example, if j is
2, then the second SNR ðw2Þ in Eq. (9) is the set threshold; therefore wj ¼ w2 with this
example. The set threshold is not the same as or related to the SNIR threshold
ðSNIRthresholdÞ in the TSB equation. The value of the percentile rank used has an effect on
the total revenue needed to subsidise the bids of the users as seen in Eq. (10). As Pc
increases the percentile ranks also increase.
2.5 The Congestion Charge
The HPU users are further charged a congestion charge which increases as the traffic load
(L) increases, as shown in Eq. (11), with the aim of regulating the congestion in the system.
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The only scenario considered in this work allows the final bid value of any user to remain
positive after the deduction of green tax and the congestion charge is only examined in this
work.
b
final
i ¼
bi þ GPi[ 0 For LPU
bi  LGPi[ 0 For HPU

ð11Þ
For i = 1, 2, 3,…, NUSA where bfinal is the final value after the deduction or addition of
the congestion and green tax of the bid in price unit. L is the traffic load in Erlang and GPi
and the green payment for user i.
2.6 Probability of a Being Among the Highest NAC Bidders PrNACð Þ
PrNAC is introduced in this paper to prevent users who have a low probability of winning
from attempting to transmit. The probability is dependent on the bid submitted by a user
and the number of available channels in the system as shown in Eq. (12).
PrNACðiÞ ¼
bi  br
Vmax  br
 NUSANAC
; NUSA[NAC ð12Þ
where br can be the value of the RP if known to the user, otherwise, it is the minimum
possible bid by user i based on the user’s budget. Vmax is the maximum possible valuation
for a user. The probability is calculated for all the users intending to transmit during any
bidding period. If the value of the probability is greater than or equal to a set probability
threshold PrThreshold (PrNACðiÞPrThreshold ) the user is allowed to attempt; otherwise, the user
stays out of the process.
2.7 The Auction Model
The auction model adopted in this work is a simultaneous first price sealed bid auction with
a reserve price. In this type of auction, no bidder knows the bid of any other user in the
system. The simultaneous process is adopted in order not to introduce significant addi-
tional delay into the system. To examine if keeping the knowledge of the RP private by the
auctioneer is beneficial to either the auctioneer or the users, we examine two types of
models: An auction model with public knowledge of RP, and an auction model without the
public knowledge of the RP (having public knowledge of RP means that all the users are
regularly updated with the current value of the RP after each auction process in order to
guide any user bidding in the next auction round).
2.8 Energy Consumed Based on the Auction Model with and Without
the Public Knowledge of the RP
A probability scheme can be used to analyse the energy consumed by the system when the
RP is fed back to the users. Let Pr represents the probability of winning, 1 Pr represents
the probability of not winning the bid and Ei represents the amount of energy consumed by
user i in putting in a bid (The probability that is calculated here is not the same as PrNAC ). It
is also assumed here that the user wins once the offered bid is above the RP and the trials
come to an end (this assumption is reasonable because no user can transmit if the offered
bid is below the RP). The total energy consumption with the probability is as shown in
Eq. (13).
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ET ¼
XNUSA
i¼1
1 Prð Þn1Pr ið ÞEi ð13Þ
In the Eq. (13), the first part of the equation is 1 represents the situation if all the users
win the auction process at the first attempt. The total energy consumed if the users do not
win on the first attempt is the cumulative sum of all failures before success, assuming
independent arrivals. As an example, if it takes 3 attempts before success, in the 4th
attempt for all the users transmitting in the system, the cumulative energy consumed for
Pr ¼ 0:5 and the total energy consumed by user i is represented as Ei for all trials up until
the first success is as shown in Eq. (14).
ET ¼
XNUT
i¼1
1 Prð ÞðiÞ11PrðiÞ þ 1 Prð ÞðiÞ21PrðiÞ þ 1 Prð ÞðiÞ31PrðiÞ

þ 1 Prð ÞðiÞ41PrðiÞ

Ei;
ð14Þ
Substituting for Pr into Eq. (14) gives:
ET ¼
XNUT
i¼1
ð0:5ðiÞ þ 0:25ðiÞ þ 0:125ðiÞ þ 0:0625ðiÞEi ð15Þ
From the Eq. (15) above, it can be seen that the energy consumed increases as the
number of attempts before success. Hence, if a user does not attempt to participate in the
auction process except when the user is sure that the bid offered is above the RP, then less
energy is consumed. This shows theoretically that the public knowledge of the RP helps in
reducing the amount of energy wasted as a result of the auction process and the RP. This is
further examined in the modelling section. A user cannot be sure of offering a price above
the RP if the RP is not a known to the user; hence the reason we examined an auction
model with the public knowledge of the RP.
2.9 The Auctioneers Revenue
The revenue of the auctioneer does not include the tax because the tax paid by HPU is
assumed to be used in subsidising the LPU. Hence, we assume that the tax paid goes into a
separate account, which is where the subsidies are taken out from.
ReðPrice UnitÞ ¼ bi  tax For HPUbi þ subsidy For LPU

ð16Þ
2.10 The Transmission Process
Two stages are assumed in this paper before a successful transmission as explained below:
STAGE 1 A user places a bid in the OFF mode: Provided the user’s PrNAC is above the
set threshold, the user moves to the second stage (PrNACðiÞ[PrThreshold ).
STAGE 2 The energy mode of the user is changed to the transmitting mode (ON) and
the user is successful in the second stage if the offered bid is above the RP and the SNIR is
above the SNIR threshold.
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Comparing the bids of the two user groups, the following are the possible outcomes
(PO) after the tax or subsidy is applied to the offered bids.
PO 1: The final bid of the HPU is greater than that of the LPU; that is bfinalHPU[ b
final
LPU. If
this occurs then the subsidy has not had a significant impact or changed the winning bidder
from a HPU to a LPU but has lowered the income of the auctioneer since bHPU has been
taxed.
PO 2: The final bid of the LPU is greater than that of the high-powered user: that is
bfinalLPU[ b
final
HPU. This means that the subsidy might have made a difference to the winning
bid; if initially bLPU[ bHPU before the green payment is applied. This has helped in
increasing the revenue of the auctioneer.
Under no circumstance is any user allowed to transmit if the final bid (after the tax or
subsidy) is below the RP leading to possible outcomes 3 and 4.
PO 3: The initial bid and the final bid of the HPU is greater than the reserve price (r).
bi[ ri. Such users is allowed to transmit provided bi is among the highest NAC bids.
PO 4: The initial bid of the LPU is below the reserve price but after the subsidy the final
bid is greater than the reserve price; that is bfinali [ r[ bi. In this case, the subsidy ensures
the bid of user i is above the RP.
2.11 The Utility Function
The utility function plays an important role in determining the achievable performance of a
system. In wireless networks, the utility of the social welfare (USW) is considered as more
important than individual utility since the network is a shared resource. However, the
utility of the social welfare is a function or the aggregate of the individual utility function
of the group. According to [25], it is defined as:
USW ¼ f ðU1;U2; . . .;UnÞ ð17Þ
where Ui is the utility function of user i where i ¼ 1; 2; . . .; n.
Individual wireless users are known to act selfishly with the aim of maximising their
utility. Defining a relative utility function can be complicated, but this paper uses the
design objective of the system to determine the desired overall utility. Generally, when
different performance metrics are used to determine the utility of a system, the weighted
power is used to show the importance of each of the individual metrics that forms the
overall utility function depending on the objective of the system. However, in the latter
part of this paper, all the metrics are assigned the same weighted power. This is because a
generic form of a utility function that can be modified based on the application of the
system in the future is proposed. In this paper, the performance of the system, such as
delay, data rate or probability of blocking due to price is used to determine the user’s utility
function.
Data Rate According to the TSB defined earlier, the data rate is dependent on the SNIR
of the user and therefore, the data rate of the user is also a measure of the user’s utility. The
higher the data rate of a user, the higher the satisfaction of such user.
UD ¼ 2
Di
Dmax  1
For i ¼ 1; 2; 3; . . .;N and Di\Dmax
0UD  1
ð18Þ
Di is the data rate of user i and Dmax is the maximum achievable data rate of the system.
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Delay (D) All wireless applications have a maximum delay that can be tolerated for the
system to achieve the desired operation. Beyond such a threshold, the system is not
feasible.
UD ¼ 2
1 DiDmax  1 for Di\Dmax
0 for Di[Dmax
(
0UD 1 and Di\Dmax
ð19Þ
where Di is the delay experienced by user i and Dmax is the maximum possible delay of the
system to make the system feasible.
Blocking Due to Price A user whose bid is below the RP has a utility as shown in
Eq. (20). Where BP is the number of times a user is blocked due to price.
UBP ¼ 2ð1BPÞ  1; 0UBP  1ð Þ ð20Þ
General Utility Before the Admission Process (UG) The general performance is analysed
so as to provide a fair and balanced combination of the different individual performance
metrics. We multiply the individual utility function together because if one of the com-
ponents which form the utility function in this paper has a value of zero, the file transmitted
by the user is not successful transmitted Hence, the reason for the multiplication. The
general utility is defined as:
UG ¼ UDUDUBP 0UG  1ð Þ ð21Þ
From this, if any of UD;UD;UBP is zero, then the overall general utility of the user is
zero or the system is not feasible. The above utility function in Eq. (21) also shows that no
user can be admitted into the system if the delay experienced cannot be tolerated by the
application in demand, the data rate required by the application cannot be provided or the
offered bid price is below the RP.
After analysing the general utility function, the utility in terms of price is also examined.
The price utility function is separated because using an auction process, it works differently
from other utility functions when combined as seen later.
General Utility with Pricing (Up) Generally, the utility of a user decreases as the value
of the offered bid increases. This is because users prefer to win the bid with a lower price in
order to maximise their utility.
Up ¼ 21
bi
bmax  1 0Up 1
 	 ð22Þ
where bmax is the maximum bid. No bidder can bid above the maximum bid value;
therefore, a user bidding the maximum is deemed to have a utility of zero and bi is the bid
submitted by user i who is a winning bidder. Any bidder who is not among the winning
bidders has a utility value of 1 in terms of price. It can be seen from the above Eq. (22) that
when using an auction process the lower the value of utility in terms of price, the better it is
for the user. This is because the price paid is always defined as a cost (i.e. negative) and
users do not usually want to incur a high cost. However, in order to include the price
function into the overall utility function, the equation is modified as shown later. There-
fore, the overall utility of individual users is:
U ¼ UG  Up ð23Þ
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This shows that the winning users paying the least have the highest utility, provided the
general utility of all users are the same. It is also worth pointing out that since an auction
process is used, this allows the highest bidder to gain access to the spectrum. However, the
price function considered in Eq. (23) examines the utility in terms of the price paid by the
winning bidders because the users want to win with the least possible amount. Therefore,
the user paying the least among the winning user has the best utility value.
The utility functions defined until this point represents the utility functions for the
individual user. It is assumed that since the spectrum is a shared resource, the utility
function of the social welfare is more important than that of the individual. However, as
shown later in Eq. (24), the utility of the social welfare is a function of the individual
utility; hence, the utility of the social welfare is defined.
2.11.1 Utility of Social Welfare
There are different objectives that can be met in the design of an auction such as efficiency.
An efficient auction should maximise the social welfare. The utility of the social welfare is
defined as the average of the total utility of all the users in the system. The individual
utility contributes to the utility of the social welfare and, therefore, there must be some
level of satisfaction from the individual user that maximises the utility of the social
welfare.
Usw ¼
PN
i¼ 1 Ui
N
ð24Þ
To maximise the utility of the social welfare, there must be an optimal individual utility.
Admission Process Utility (Ua) This part shows how the price paid by each user affects
the admission process. An expression for the utility of each of the users in terms of the GP
is firstly defined, and then combined with the price utility to determine the utility in terms
of the admission process.
Utility of the GP (UGP) The GP is divided in two, the tax and the subsidy. If a user is
taxed, the utility function is defined as:
UGP ¼  2
Rt
i
Rtmax  1
 !
; i ¼ 1; 2; 3; . . .;NUSA ð25Þ
where Rti is the green tax paid by the user, R
t
max is the maximum tax paid by any of the users
and NUSAt is the total number of bidder paying a tax among the NUSA bidders who are
attempting to gain access to the channel. From Eq. (25), it can be seen that a user paying a
tax has a negative utility. The utility for a user receiving a subsidy is:
UR ¼ 2
Rs
i
Rsmax
 
 1
 !
; i ¼ 1; 2; 3; . . .;NUSA ð26Þ
where Rsi is the subsidy paid by user i, R
s
max is the maximum subsidy paid by any of the
users and NUSA is the total number of bidder receiving a form of subsidy among the NUSA
bidders who are attempting to gain access to the channel. Combining the utility for the
price and the GP:
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Ua ¼ ð1 UPÞ þ UGP
2
ð27Þ
If the Ua values of all the bidders who wants to gain access to the channel at bidding
round t is represented by set NUSA as giving in Eqs. (28) and (29) in descending order then
a maximum of NAC users who are having the highest Ua utility value is admitted into the
system provided their bid is above the RP and can be represented by NNAC where
NKc  NNUSA
NNUSAðtÞ ¼ U1aU2aU3a   UNACa UNAC þ 1a UNAC þ 2a   UNUSAa

  ð28Þ
NKcðtÞ ¼ ½U1aU2aU3a   UNACa ð29Þ
From the above equations, the following can be concluded:
• A user, who is paying a low tax and has a high offered bid, has a high utility value and
therefore, might be admitted into the system to transmit.
• A user, who is receiving a high value of subsidy and whose initial bid is high, has a
very high probability of being admitted into the system.
2.11.2 Utility of the Wireless Service Provider
The utility of the WSP is determined by the number of users admitted simultaneously into
the system, since spectrum re-use in adjacent cells is assumed. The utility of the WSP is
given as:
UwspðtÞ ¼ 2
PNoc
i¼1 NUTðtÞPNoc
i¼1 NTCðtÞ  1 ð30Þ
where Noc is the total number of cells in the system.
PNOC
i¼1 NUTðtÞ gives the cumulative sum
of all channels in use in all the cells up to time period t and
PNOC
i¼1 NTCðtÞ gives the
cumulative sum of all available channels in all the cells up to time period t.
3 System Model Description
One spectrum broker, N users and and NTC transmission channels in each cell are modeled
in an infrastructure based uplink scenario, where each user is transmitting at a fixed power
(high or low) level depending on the group the user belongs to. This work is based on the
hexagonal cell structure with a fixed frequency reuse factor as specified in the parameters
table. The flow chart from the user point of view is shown in Fig. 4a while Fig. 4b shows
the flow chart based on the WSP’s point of view.
The channel assignment scheme is based on the least interfered channel. A Poisson
distribution process with arrival rate (k) and inter arrival rate described by an exponential
distribution is assumed. Each user who wants to transmit at each auction period submits a
uniform sealed bid biði ¼ 1; 2; 3; . . .;NUSAÞ to the spectrum broker depending on the user’s
budget, based on Eqs. (2) or (3) as explained earlier. A bidder who loses a bid in a bidding
round during time t increases the bid in the next bidding period (t þ 1) as shown in the
modelling flow chart in Fig. 5. This process is repeated until a steady state is reached. The
path loss is based on the WINNER II B2 model. A bid is submitted by a user after the
A. A. Oloyede, D. Grace
123
calculation of the probability of being among the highest NAC bidder ðPNACÞ as specified. If
the probability calculated by a user is above the set threshold ðPrNACðiÞPrðTthresholdÞÞ,
then, the GP and congestion charge is applied as explained earlier. A user is assumed to
have transmitted successfully, provided the SNIR and final bid price is above the SNIR
threshold and the RP. After the auction process, the number of winning bidders that
emerges is represented as NWU and NUT is the number of successful bidders.
This paper considers two different bidding scenarios: the Single Bidding Process (SBP)
and the Multiple Bidding Process (MBP). These two bidding processes are illustrated using
Fig. 6a, b. The SBP involves the users bidding in a single round before the transmission
period. The implementation concept of the SBP can be described as shown in the example
in Fig. 6a. In this example, it is assumed that 5 users are arriving out of the N possible users
during each of the bidding periods. The users are represented as Nai , where the subscript i
represents the user number and superscript a represent the packet number. Hence, N21
means that user number one is about to send packet number two. Three channels are
assumed to be available in each bidding period (in our modeling process, the number of
available channel varies). The RP is assumed and the spectrum broker is not aware of this
value. The transmission period is represented as T. In the first bidding period, users 1–5
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Fig. 4 a Flow chart from users point of view. b Flow chart from the WSP’s point of view
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arrive into the system, each with a bidding value as indicated in the figure. Since 3
channels are available, the auctioneer picks the 3 users with the highest bidding values (N1,
N5 and N4). From the example, it can be seen that there are times that channels are
available but not used. To reduce the number of times when channels are available but not
put to use, the concepts of MBP is examined. The MBP is introduced because despite
having more than 3 users offering a bid above the RP during period t3 in the previous
example with SBP, only 3 users were picked as winners and those 3 are allocated the
transmitting channels during transmission period T3.
The concept of MBP allows for a losing bidder to attempt again in the same bidding
period as shown in Fig. 6b. Hence, it is assume that an instant feedback exists between the
service provider and users. In this case, we assume that the auctioneer is aware of the RP
because there is no way of carrying out a MBP without the auctioneer having such
information. The auctioneer only sends bidders whose bids are above the RP to the WSP
for the allocation of transmission channels. Here, the system is assumed to have a buffer to
queue the winning bidders as they come into the system. The actual number of bidding
rounds carried out is dependent on the number of winners emerging in each round and the
number of channels available. The auction round only stops when NAC ¼ NWU. Therefore,
Traffic model
(Schedule next 
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Start
Green Payments? Green Payment (Tax subtracted)
Green Payment 
(Subsidy added)
Highest bidder is 
determined
IS bid above 
reserve price?
End
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No
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threshold?
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allocated to 
highest
bidder(s)
No
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Price Generation
Is the Probability
above the 
Threshold?
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Fig. 5 System flow chart
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the GP can help solve the problem of channel quality by penalising the high powered users
who are causing the interference to other users in the system. As an illustration for MBP,
assuming x ¼ 4 and NUSA ¼ 8. If in the first bidding round only 2 bidders out of the 8
bidders have probabilities above the set threshold, the two users are admitted and queued in
the buffer while the remaining 6 bidders increase their bids accordingly.
4 Results and Discussion
This section shows and explains the results obtained from the simulation using 19 cells
with cell radius of 2 km. We assume 200 users in each cell (100 HPU and 100 LPU), file
size of 2 Gbits and a cell reuse factor of 3. Firstly, PrNAC is varied to determine the effect of
the probability on the number of users admitted into the system. Based on this, the value
for the threshold that helps in reducing the energy consumed by the system without
reducing the other system performance metric significantly is determined. The remaining
parameters used are given in the Table 1.
Figure 7 shows the probability of blocking due to price per files generated when the
threshold ðPrðTthresholdÞÞ of PrNAC is varied from 0 to 1. In general, for all the 3 scenarios
examined, the number of users that are blocked due to price is reducing as the threshold is
increasing. This is because when the threshold is 0 all the users entering the system are
attempting, but a significant number of them are blocked because the offered bid price is
below the RP. However, as the threshold is introduced and as it is increasing, some of the
users whose probability of being among the highest NAC bidders are no longer attempting,
hence, the number of users that are blocked due to price is reducing with an increase in the
threshold. When the threshold is set to a value of 1, all the users attempting are offering a
bid value that is above the RP, resulting in none of the users being blocked. The MBP with
Knowledge of RP (KRP) performs best because on the average, the users are placing only a
Fig. 6 a Single bidding process. b Multiple bidding periods
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bid that is above the RP. The MBP process without the KRP has no significant effect on the
number of users who are blocked due to price when compared to the single bidding process
at low values of the threshold. This is because the result examined here deals with only the
number of users whose bid are above the RP, and it does not matter if the MBP or SBP is
used, as long as the users are bidding below the RP. When the value of the set threshold is
high, most of the users attempting are having a value that is below the set threshold, hence
only a few users are attempting and fewer users are getting blocked due to price.
Figure 7 does not show if setting the value too high affects the performance of the
system especially in terms of throughput. This is because the system might be operating
below its capacity if the threshold is set too high.
Figure 8 shows the throughput against the threshold of PrNAC . A user is assumed to get
through provided the user succeeds in having a probability value above the set threshold in
both stages and the SNIR is above the SNIR threshold. It can be seen that with the SBP, the
throughput reduces drastically with the increase in the threshold because as the threshold
increases the number of admitted users reduces. This is due to fewer users having a
probability above the threshold. Therefore, more channels are available than the number of
admitted users after an auction round, leaving some of the transmit channels idle. With the
MBP, the throughput reduces initially because at lower threshold values, some of the users
actually get through stage 1 but fail at stage 2 due to the users offering a bid price below
the RP. As the probability increases, more users are only attempting when their offered bid
price is above the RP. With the KRP a user that gets through in stage one is more likely to
have an offered bid that is above the RP especially as the threshold is increasing. However,
the throughput reduces slightly as the threshold increases because only users offering bids
close to Vmax can move from stage one to stage two. As the threshold increases and the
traffic loads are relatively constant, the system is sometimes loaded below its capacity.
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Hence, the reason for having a lower throughput that the maximum throughput that the
system can support.
So far, the threshold helps in reducing the number of users that are not able to transmit
after winning the auction process. Hence, it is important to determine the appropriate value
for PrThreshold . This value should take into account all the factors such as delay, throughput
energy consumed and blocking probability in such a way that none of these performance
metrics is badly affected. To determine the appropriate value for the probability threshold
(Prthreshold ) to be used in the future analysis, the deviation of the performance metrics (delay,
energy consumed, throughput and probability of blocking) as shown in Eq. (31) is nor-
malised and it is called the Normalised Difference (ND), whereMVi is the value obtained at
point i for the metric under consideration MVmax and MVmin are the maximum and minimum
values respectively for the performance metric under consideration respectively.
ND ¼ MVmax MVi
MVmax MVmin
ð31Þ
To balance all the performance parameters without trading off one of the other per-
formance parameters too much, the midpoint between the crossover point is chosen. From
Fig. 9, this is 0.55, and this is used as the probability threshold.
Figure 10 shows throughput against the traffic load. The MBP without the KRP per-
forms slightly worse as expected. This is because with the MBP with the RP, NUT is equal
or almost equal to NAC. This is unlike the SBP or the MBP without the KRP where the
throughput of the system is significantly less than the traffic load because NUT is not always
or almost equal to NAC. This shows that the MBP can only provide a better performance if
the users have the KRP or, better still, if the users are aware of the GP if paying a tax.
However, the average delay per file sent as seen in Fig. 11 performs better with when
using the probability to determine the admission process compared to the scheme with the
GP alone. The delay with known KRP performs best of the three scenarios. The delay is
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increasing with the traffic load because as the traffic load increases the collision in the
system also increases.
From Fig. 12, using the GP alone, the energy increases linearly with the traffic load.
However, with the probability introduced, the increases can no longer be described as
linear but similar to a parabola as the traffic load increases. As the traffic load increases,
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fewer go into the transmitting mode and are not able to transmit successfully. The KRP
algorithm performs best because of the reasons stated earlier in Figs. 10 and 11.
Furthermore, Fig. 13 shows the average price paid per file sent. The result shows that
with or without the KRP, the average revenue is almost the same. This shows that the price
difference between having and not having the KRP is quite small. However, compared
with the loss in terms of energy consumed and delay, having the knowledge of the RP is
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important. The average price also increases with the traffic load because the RP and the
bids of the users increase the traffic load.
Figure 14a shows the general user utility against traffic load with and without the GP.
The scheme with the GP involves MBP. The utility of the LPU without the GP decreases
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with increases in traffic load as a result of the interference caused by the HPU to the LPU.
At low traffic loads, there are more channels available than required. Without the GP, the
LPU receives no incentive and, therefore, their bids are sometimes rejected due to price.
The utility of the LPU with the GP is relatively constant. This is because of the incentive
received from the GP. The utility of the HPU with the GP decreases slightly as the traffic
load increases. This is because they get squeezed out as the traffic load increases, thereby
leading to more delay. Using the probability threshold with the MBP allows the utility of
the HPU to be relatively high because the HPU only transmits when their calculated
probability is above the threshold. This is due to calculating the utility for the delay and
data rate being calculated only when a user is admitted into the system. However, without
the GP, the general utility of the HPU is higher because they dominate the system. This is
an undesirable effect because the utility of the social welfare should be of concern. This
can be seen in Fig. 14b with the combined utility of all the users showing the utility of the
social welfare. The scheme without the GPs is better than the scheme with the GP. This
also shows that with the GP the HPU are disadvantaged, but the system gives a better
performance as a whole. The utility without the GP falls with the traffic load because as the
traffic load increases the LPU are performing worse. This is because they have a low value
in all the utility factors (Delay, data rate and bid being below RP) that were taken into
account while calculating the utility. However, with the GP, the HPU experiences more
delay, but the higher data rate compensates for the loss due to the delay. The LPU has a
lower data rate compared to the HPU but they make up for this with a shorter delay. The
relative increases of the utility with the GP as the traffic load increases is because as the
traffic load increases the HPU are squeezed out. Therefore, compared with the admitted
users the LPU has a high utility for data rate and all the other factors. This is because the
utility is calculated in terms of date rate and delay only if a user is admitted into the system.
5 Conclusions
In this work, we have designed an auction based dynamic spectrum access network for
future heterogeneous wireless networks with secondary users as opportunistic users of the
radio spectrum. The work proposed a green payment based single and multiple bidding
processes for short-term spectrum auction and showed that the MBP is more energy
efficient than the SBP. This work also showed the effects of using the probability of being
among the highest NAC bidder (PrNAC ) with the MBP and how it affects the system per-
formance such as delay and throughput. It showed that if an appropriate value of the
threshold of the probability is set, the amount of energy consumed by the system and the
delay can be reduced. It also showed that the energy consumed by the system and other
system performance measures can be improved when the users have the knowledge of the
RP and the approximated tax to be paid as a result of the green payments. It showed that
the knowledge of the RP has no effect on the revenue of the WSP since truthful bidding
was assumed. Finally, the proposed scheme could be used to improve the congestion in the
system and provide a better utility to optimise the social welfare of the users while also
providing a better utility to the service provider.
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